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As the dialogue begins, Socrates is on his way to court to face charges of teaching false gods and corrupting the youth. He meets Euthyphro on the steps of the court building. Euthyphro is on his way to court to prosecute his father for murder. They stop to talk.
Socrates, 70 years old, is a relentless questioner who, as he pumps Euthyphro for information, professes his own ignorance. Socrates makes great use of irony in this dialogue in his description of his accuser, Meletus, and in his attitude toward Euthyphro. Euthyphro, a soothsayer, is rather egotistical. He is confident of his case against his father, and in his knowledge of piety.
Socrates, surprised at Euthyphro's charge against his father, asks him if he is sure that what he is doing is pious, or holy. He asks Euthyphro to tell him the nature of piety and impiety. Socrates assumes that there is one essential nature of piety that includes whatever is pious.
Euthyphro offers the first of many definitions when he proclaims, "Piety is doing as I am doing." He supports this with an example from Greek mythology when Zeus punishes his father, Chronos, for eating his children. Socrates objects that this is an example, not a definition.
Euthyphro offers his second definition when he proclaims, "Piety is that which is dear to the gods." Socrates accepts this as a definition, but gets Euthyphro to admit that the gods sometimes differ about what they love and hate. By this definition, then, the same thing can be both pious and impious. Thus the definition leads to a contradiction.
Euthyphro offers his third definition by modifying the previous one: "What all the gods love is pious." Socrates then asks if (A) an act is loved by the gods because it is pious, or (B) an act is pious because it is loved by the gods. Euthyphro admits that (A) the gods love an act because it is pious. Thus Euthyphro's definition is really only a characteristic of piety, not its definition.
This passage of the Euthyphro is very difficult; in fact, it is some of the hardest reading you will encounter in the course, and deserves a second look. The question is similar to one we could ask about Mother Teresa (whom most of us agree is pious and engages in pious acts): Is it (A) God loves Mother Teresa because she is pious, or (B) she is pious because God loves her? Which comes first, (A) the piety of the action, or (B) God's loving the action? If (A), then God's loving an act does not make it pious, but is only a characteristic of piety.
At this point, Euthyphro's mood changes; he is becoming frustrated and less confident. He says, "I really do not know . . . how to express what I mean." He accuses Socrates of being Daedalus, who sets arguments in motion. Socrates, in turn, accuses Euthyphro of being lazy, and he forces the argument forward.
Socrates asks whether piety is a part of justice, or justice a part of piety. Euthyphro agrees that piety is a part of justice. Socrates has led the conversation toward a more universal idea, justice, which includes the notion of piety.
Euthyphro offers a fourth definition: "Piety . . . [is] that part of justice which attends to the gods." Socrates asks what he means by "attention." He adds that attention usually benefits that which gets the attention. Euthyphro explains that the attention is like ministration to the gods.
Socrates then points out that ministration to someone usually means assisting him in his work. He asks what ministration to the gods helps them to do. Euthyphro objects that the discussion has become tiresome.
Euthyphro asserts his fifth definition: "Piety . . . is learning how to please the gods by prayers and sacrifices." Socrates interprets this as a "science of asking and giving," and asks what benefit the gods get from gifts. Euthyphro answers that they get "tributes of honor"; they are pleased, not benefitted.
Socrates points out that by saying piety gives pleasure to the gods, they have returned to an earlier definition, that "piety is that which is dear to the gods." At this point, Euthyphro finds an excuse to leave, and the discussion ends.
In conclusion, one of Socrates's key ideas is that admitting your own ignorance is the first step toward wisdom. Well, Euthyphro must admit his own ignorance, but whether or not he gives up on the charge against his father is up to you to decide. Another point we can gather from the dialogue is that Socrates believed that abstract universals such as piety form a hierarchy, and the higher ones, like justice, inform the lower. Finally, we have learned that the search for truth is never-ending.
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Stephen Carden stephen.carden@kctcs.net
August 30, 1999